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ROMEO AND JULIETS: A MODERN WORKPLACE
TRAGEDY
Cheryl L. Howard*
PROLOGUE
One supervisor, lacking in dignity,
Near fair Verona,' where we lay our scene,
From years of abuse to a court's sympathy,
Where civil relationships lead to civil suits non-routine.
From forth the judgment of the court,
A decision bringing star-cross 'd employees strife,
And one that may cause employers to resort,
To more closely monitoring a supervisor's sex life.
Shakespeare's Romeo and Juliet starts out as a classic love story: boy
meets girl, boy falls in love with girl, boy and girl get married. Of course,
it turns into a tragedy when they realize that their relationship is destined to
fail. Surprisingly, many offices in corporate America follow a similar--
though less morbid--trend. A 2005 survey revealed that 58% of employees
had dated someone at work; 14% of the employees dated a boss or
superior; and 19% dated a subordinate.2 While relationships between
supervisors and subordinates may start off well, their controversial nature
can result in unfortunate consequences.
Paramour favoritism refers to a situation where a supervisor bestows
special benefits upon a subordinate as a result of a sexual relationship
between them.' When the relationship is consensual, it generally does not
* Cheryl L. Howard is an associate at Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP, in New
York City. Special thanks are due to Professor Charles Shanor, who provided many helpful
comments on an earlier draft.
1. Verona, California, is less than 200 miles from the city of Chowchilla, where both
prison facilities at issue in the Miller case discussed throughout this Article, are located.
2. Mireya Navarro, Love the Job? What About Your Boss?, N.Y. TIMES, July 24,
2005, at II.
3. See Policy Guidance on Employer Liability under Title VII for Sexual Favoritism,
EEOC Notice No. 915-048 (Jan. 12, 1990) [hereinafter, Policy Guidance on Employer
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result in sexual harassment or discrimination.4 Although other employees
in the office, both men and women, may feel that the situation is unethical
or unfair, it is not sexual discrimination because both groups are
disadvantaged for reasons other than their sex.
Most courts that have confronted this issue have held that paramour
favoritism is not actionable under Title VII.5 Recently, however, the
California Supreme Court "stir[red] the world of employment law" 6 and
unanimously held that widespread sexual favoritism in the workplace may
have created a hostile work environment for the plaintiffs. In Miller v.
Department of Corrections,7 the California Supreme Court reversed the
appellate court's grant of summary judgment and held that the plaintiffs
presented a prima facie case of sexual harassment.8
The California Supreme Court's decision in Miller was the first
appellate decision to adopt the 1990 EEOC Policy Statement and hold that
widespread sexual favoritism resulting from consensual relationships could
create a hostile work environment. 9 Although Miller came down from a
state court, it was based on federal law; thus, Miller may serve as
persuasive authority in future cases.' °  The holding is troublesome,
however, because it leaves many questions unanswered. Since it is the first
appellate decision to apply the EEOC Policy Statement, future courts
addressing similar issues may have trouble discerning the appropriate legal
standard and following its precedent.
This article analyzes Miller to determine what standard it creates for
hostile work environment claims based on widespread sexual favoritism,
and examines the effect it may have on future employment law cases,
especially in the area of sexual harassment. Part I introduces the concept of
a hostile work environment claim and describes the plaintiff's burden of
proof for bringing such a claim. Part II discusses the 1990 EEOC Policy
Statement and its effect on subsequent court decisions. Part III delves into
the Miller decision, to learn exactly why the court unanimously held that
Liability], available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (providing the
basic guidelines regarding relationships between supervisors or managers and their
subordinates).
4. See infra Part II.A.
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. H.J. Cummins, Sex-Harassment Ruling Could Have National Impact; A Decision by
California 's High Court was Based on Federal Discrimination Law. A Similar Trial is
Brewing in Minnesota, STAR TRIBUNE (Minneapolis, Minn.), Jan. 12, 2006, at ID.
7. 115 P.3d 77 (Cal. 2005).
8. Id. at 80.
9. See David Kadue & Thomas Kaufman, A Tragedy of Manners: Flawed Reasoning
Equates Workplace Sexuality with Gender Discrimination, RECORDER, Aug. 12, 2005, at 6
("[U]ntil now--no appellate court has squarely adopted this EEOC litigation position.").
10. See Cummins, supra note 6 (explaining that "[s]ome lawyers foresee a big impact
on employers nationwide").
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the plaintiffs presented a prima facie case of hostile work environment
sexual harassment. Part IV analyzes the standard that Miller created to try
and determine which factors were most influential for the court. Finally,
Part V looks to future implications that the decision may have for sexual
harassment law, as well as other types of employment discrimination cases.
I. HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT CLAIMS
Courts currently recognize two forms of sexual harassment: quid pro
quo and hostile work environment." Quid pro quo sexual harassment
occurs when a supervisor takes adverse employment actions against an
employee who does not submit to his or her sexual advances. 2 A claim for
hostile work environment sexual harassment requires no such tangible
action. Rather, "a plaintiff may establish a violation of Title VII by
proving that discrimination based on sex has created a hostile or abusive
work environment."' 13 A "hostile or abusive work environment" is one
where the harassment is so severe or pervasive that it "alter[s] the
conditions of [the plaintiffs] employment and create[s] an abusive working
environment."' 4 In Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, the Supreme Court
held that the plaintiff established a hostile work environment claim based
on the following facts: her supervisor demanded sexual favors from her,
both during and after business hours; he touched her inappropriately in
front of other employees; he exposed himself to her in the women's
restroom; and he forcibly raped her.'5
Less than a decade after the Supreme Court decided Meritor, it was
faced with another hostile work environment claim and was forced to
further clarify the meaning of "abusive work environment."'' 6 While the
Court did not provide an exact formula for determining whether an
environment is "abusive," the Court applied both an objective and a
subjective standard. 7 For a work environment to be "abusive," it must be
one that both a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive, and one
that the plaintiff actually found to be abusive. 8 Additionally, the Court
enumerated a list of factors to consider: the frequency and severity of the
discriminatory conduct, whether it was physically threatening or
humiliating, and whether it unreasonably interfered with the employee's
11. See 45B AM. JUR. 2D Job Discrimination § 824 (2004).
12. See id.
13. Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 66 (1986).
14. Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11 th Cir. 1982)).
15. Id. at 60.
16. Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 17 (1993).
17. Id. at21-22.
18. Id.
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performance.1 9  The Court acknowledged that psychological harm is
another factor to consider, but psychological harm is not a required element
of hostile work environment claims; an abusive work environment may
detract from an employee's job performance, regardless of whether she
suffers tangible psychological injuries.2 °
Through its decisions, the United States Supreme Court has illustrated
that it will not tolerate sexual harassment in the workplace. The Court has
taken a "middle path ' 21 in holding that a few inappropriate statements do
not create an abusive working environment on their own, but continual
harassing conduct may cause a work environment to be hostile. Although
the Court has considered many aspects of sexual harassment, it has not
addressed the effect of paramour favoritism in the workplace. The EEOC,
however, promulgated guidelines addressing that very issue.22
II. THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION POLICY
STATEMENT AND CASES
The following section examines the background of paramour
favoritism claims. It begins by analyzing the 1990 EEOC Policy
Statement, and it discusses the cases on which the Policy Statement relied.
This section then explains how courts have resolved paramour favoritism
claims since the EEOC issued the Policy Statement.
A. 1990 EEOC Policy Statement
In 1990, the EEOC circulated a new policy statement regarding
paramour favoritism and sexual harassment.23 The Policy Statement, which
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas signed when he was the EEOC
Chairman, has served as a reference for many courts that have considered
19. Id. at 23.
20. Id. at 22. The Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit and district court decisions,
which had held that a workplace environment was not considered "abusive" unless the
plaintiff suffered psychological harm. Id.
21. Id. at 21.
22. Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra note 3.
23. The 1990 Policy Statement modified the EEOC's former position on sexual
favoritism. In 1980, the EEOC implied that an element of coercion was necessary for a
plaintiff to state a claim for sexual favoritism. See EEOC Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(g) (West 2007) (considering situations "where
employment opportunities or benefits are granted because of an individual's submission to
the employer's sexual advances or requests for sexual favors") (emphasis added); see also
DeCintio v. Westchester County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 307-08 (2d Cir. 1986) (explaining
that the word "submission," as used in the 1980 EEOC guidelines, implies that coercion is
necessary to state a claim for sexual harassment based on paramour favoritism).
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paramour favoritism claims. 24 Although the 1990 EEOC Policy Statement
is not binding authority, the United States Supreme Court previously
deferred to the EEOC's position when the Court stated that the 1980 policy
guidelines "constitute a body of experience and informed judgment to
which courts and litigants may properly resort for guidance. 25
In claims of paramour favoritism, generally an employee argues that a
supervisor violated Title VII when he awarded a job benefit or promotion
to a female employee who was engaging in sexual relations with that
supervisor.26 When considering claims of paramour favoritism, the EEOC
first divides the claims into two categories: situations in which women are
coerced into submitting to unwelcome sexual advances and those that
involve consensual relationships. 27  The EEOC asserts that when a
supervisor coerces a female employee by offering her a job benefit in
exchange for sexual favors, other qualified women in the office who did
not receive the benefit may state a claim for paramour favoritism.28 This
situation constitutes sexual harassment because the female employee would
have been required to grant sexual favors to obtain the job benefit; this
requirement would not be imposed on men. 29 Thus, any female employee
could bring a sexual harassment claim, because sex was a condition for
women to obtain that job benefit.3 °
When the relationship between a supervisor and employee is
consensual, it is more difficult for plaintiffs to state an actionable claim of
paramour favoritism. The general consensus among courts, as well as the
EEOC, is that one instance of favoritism is not sexual harassment.3' One of
24. See, e.g., Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, 1300 (11th Cir. 1998) (referring to
the 1990 EEOC Policy Statement when deciding a claim of sexual favoritism).
25. Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986). See also Drinkwater v.
Union Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 859 n.10 (3d Cir. 1990) (stating that the Third Circuit
would defer to EEOC guidelines in sexual harassment cases). But see Weldon v.
Weyerhaeuser Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21486, at *19 n.6 (N.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 1994)
("Unlike the [1980] EEOC Guidelines, the EEOC Policy Guidance on Sexual Favoritism is
an interpretive memorandum that was not issued pursuant to the notice and comment
rulemaking provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553."); David Kadue
& Thomas Kaufman, supra n. 9 at 6 ("The 1980 EEOC Guidelines cited by Meritor were
duly promulgated interpretative regulations, codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11, while the pro-
plaintiff commentary in the 1990 policy guidance, by contrast, is essentially the EEOC's
litigation position....").
26. Michael J. Phillips, The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism,
51 WASH. & LEEL. REv. 547, 549 (1994).
27. See Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra note 3.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. See also Wilson v. Delta State Univ., 143 F. App'x 611, 614 (5th Cir. 2005)
("When an employer discriminates in favor of a paramour, such an action is not sex-based
discrimination, as the favoritism, while unfair, disadvantages both sexes alike for reasons
2007]
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the leading cases in this area involved a supervisor in a New York hospital
who created a new higher-level position for a female staff member with
whom he was romantically involved.32 The male employees sued for
sexual discrimination, alleging that the supervisor designed the
requirements for the new position so that his paramour was the only
employee eligible for it.33 The Second Circuit held that the male
employees were not prejudiced because of their gender; they did not
receive the position simply because the supervisor "preferred his
paramour. 3 4 Any other female applicant would have faced exactly the
same barriers to receiving the position. Additionally, the court noted that
the plaintiffs argument would require courts to police individuals'
relationships, and the court was not willing to accept that burden.35 This
case set forth the majority rule: when a supervisor in a consensual
relationship promotes the woman with whom he is involved, and another
employee--male or female--is denied the promotion, it is not sexual
harassment because both men and other women are disadvantaged for
reasons other than their gender.
36
Although one instance of paramour favoritism is not sexual
harassment, the EEOC takes the position that multiple relationships in the
workplace may create a hostile work environment. According to the EEOC
Policy Statement:
If favoritism based upon the granting of sexual favors is
widespread in the workplace, both male and female colleagues
who do not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work
environment ... regardless of whether any objectionable conduct
is directed at them and regardless of whether those who were
granted favorable treatment willingly bestowed the sexual
other than gender.... [I]t is settled law in this Circuit that such paramour favoritism does
not run afoul of Title VII .... ") (internal citations omitted); DeCintio v. Westchester
County Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that male employees did not
state a claim for sexual discrimination based on an isolated instance of sexual favoritism);
Badrinauth v. MetLife Corp., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4790, at *10-11 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2006)
(holding that the plaintiff did not state a claim for sexual favoritism based on his superior's
preferential treatment for the female employee with whom he was having an affair).
32. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 305-06.
33. Id. at 306.
34. Id. at 308.
35. Id.
36. One of the few cases that reached an opposite holding is King v. Palmer, 778 F.2d
878 (D.C. Cir. 1986). In King, the court suggested that a plaintiff could bring a claim for
paramour favoritism where she was denied a promotion and a less qualified candidate, who
was involved with her supervisor, received the position. This case, however, demonstrates
the minority view. See Weldon v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21486, at *25
(N.D. Ala. Nov. 8, 1994) ("Since the decision in King, almost all courts considering the
issue of sexual favoritism have followed DeCintio by rejecting the idea that Title VII
prohibits sexual favoritism.").
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favors.37
When the sexual favoritism is widespread, it conveys the message that the
supervisors view women as "sexual playthings," and the workplace
environment demeans all women who work there. 38 Any male or female
employee who finds this environment to be offensive may establish a
violation if the conduct meets the "hostile or abusive" standard that the
Supreme Court set out in Meritor.39 Furthermore, when managers engage
in widespread sexual favoritism, they imply that women can advance in the
workplace by engaging in sexual conduct.4' This could constitute an
implicit "quid pro quo" harassment claim for female employees, and it may
also allow a hostile environment claim for both men and women who are
offended by this behavior.4'
B. Cases Prior To the EEOC Policy Statement
The EEOC began its discussion of widespread favoritism by stating
that widespread sexual favoritism in the workplace can form the basis of a
hostile work environment claim for both male and female employees who
object to the behavior. The EEOC compared this situation to one in which
supervisors make frequent racial, ethnic, or sexual jokes, and it cited a Fifth
Circuit decision for support: "Even if the targets of the humor 'play along'
and in no way display that they object, co-workers of any race, national
origin or sex can claim that this conduct . . .creates a hostile work
environment for them., 42 In making this comparison, the EEOC implied
that its position was in accordance with previous case law. However, the
EEOC cited only one case where a court held that consensual sexual
relationships caused the plaintiff to be subjected to a hostile work
environment.
When stating that widespread sexual favoritism may form the basis of
a sexual harassment claim, the EEOC Policy Statement cited the 1988
District of Columbia case, Broderick v. Ruder.43 In Broderick, a female
staff attorney at the Securities and Exchange Commission brought a sexual
harassment claim based on the open sexual relationships between two of
her supervisors and their secretaries. 44  The supervisors awarded the
37. Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra note 3.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1971)).
43. 685 F. Supp. 1269 (D.D.C. 1988).
44. See id. at 1274.
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secretaries promotions, cash awards, and other job benefits. 45 Additionally,
a third supervisor was "noticeably attracted" 46 to an attorney with whom he
socialized, and he awarded her a promotion.47 Last, the plaintiff endured
direct harassment, including an incident where one of her supervisors
became drunk at a party, untied her sweater, and kissed her.48 Eventually
the plaintiffs performance evaluations deteriorated and she received low
marks in the category of respect for her supervisors and their authority.
49
The plaintiff claimed that numerous incidents caused the workplace to
be a sexually charged environment, and as a result, she was unable to
maintain respect for her supervisors. ° She found her supervisors' conduct
to be "repugnant and offensive," and this affected both her motivation and
her work performance. The court held for the plaintiff, because she
was forced to work in an environment in which the WRO
managers by their conduct harassed her and other WRO female
employees, by bestowing preferential treatment upon those who
submitted to their sexual advances. Further, this preferential
treatment undermined plaintiffs motivation and work
performance and deprived plaintiff, and other WRO female
employees, of promotions and job opportunities. 2
Both the plaintiff and other female employees found the sexual conduct and
accompanying rewards to be offensive,53 and the court agreed that the
numerous relationships created a hostile workplace environment.
The Broderick court was the first court to hold that a plaintiff could
bring a hostile work environment sexual harassment claim based on
consensual relationships between supervisors and subordinates.54 Although
many subsequent decisions have cited Broderick and agreed with its
holding,55 none of those courts held that the plaintiffs actually established a
45. Id.
46. Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra note 3.
47. Broderick, 685 F. Supp at 1274.
48. Id. at 1273.
49. Id. at 1272.
50. Id. at 1273.
51. Id. at 1278.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Although the plaintiff had been subjected to several instances of direct harassment,
those events were not crucial to the court's decision. In its holding, the court stated, "Ms.
Broderick was herself sexually harassed . . . [b]ut we need not emphasize these isolated
incidents." Id. at 1278.
55. See, e.g., Ritchie v. Dep't of State Police, 805 N.E.2d 54, 60 n.12 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004) (citing Broderick and explaining that "there may be cases where the facts and
circumstances of the favoritism and the office paramour's conduct rise to the level of
creating a sexually hostile environment," but "[i]n the instant case, the allegations set forth
in the plaintiff's complaint appear too thin to establish that she was exposed to an
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prima facie case for a hostile work environment claim based on widespread
sexual favoritism.
C. Cases After Broderick and the 1990 EEOC Policy Statement
Since the EEOC issued its Policy Statement, several courts have
recognized that a plaintiff may state a hostile work environment claim
where the hostile environment results from the supervisor's preferential
treatment of his paramour.5 6 Although these courts accept that a plaintiff
could establish a claim for hostile work environment based on paramour
favoritism, they have been reluctant to hold that the case before them
actually did satisfy the requirements for that claim.57 For example, in
Drinkwater v. Union Carbide, the plaintiff argued that the relationship
between her supervisor and coworker created an "oppressive and
intolerable environment." '58 The Third Circuit acknowledged, in dictum,
that a plaintiff could bring a hostile work environment claim if "the sexual
relationship" makes the plaintiff "feel that she is judged only by her
sexuality."59  However, the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff in the
current case did not prove that the workplace was a "sexually charged
environment. 6 ° When examining the environment itself, the court stated,
"[T]here is no evidence that [the supervisor and employee] flaunted the
romantic nature of their relationship, nor is there evidence that these kinds
of relationships were prevalent.",61 While the Drinkwater court recognized
that a plaintiff could state a claim for sexual harassment based on
widespread favoritism, the court found that the plaintiffs facts did not
atmosphere so 'sexually charged'..."). Id. at 662.
56. See, e.g., Badrinauth v. MetLife Corp., No. 04-2552, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4790
at *12 (D.N.J. Feb. 6, 2006) (acknowledging that a cause of action for hostile work
environment based on widespread favoritism is cognizable); see also Nicolo v. Citibank
N.Y., N.A., 554 N.Y.S.2d 795, 799 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990) (explaining that "sexual
favoritism, which became pervasive to the extent of creating a hostile work environment,
would also be actionable") (citation omitted).
57. See Badrinauth, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4790 at * 12; see also Drinkwater v. Union
Carbide Corp., 904 F.2d 853, 859 (3d Cir. 1990) (noticing that Broderick was the only case
the Third Circuit found where a court held that the relationship between a supervisor and a
co-worker created a hostile environment).
58. 904 F.2d at 861 (internal quotations omitted). The plaintiff asserted that the
paramour "disregarded office hours, [and] plagiarized the work of other employees."
Additionally, the supervisor and paramour frequently fraternized in an unprofessional
manner, and the supervisor reassigned work from his paramour to the plaintiff. Id. at 855.
Furthermore, at the end of one meeting, the supervisor told the plaintiff that an additional
criterion for her job performance would be her ability to get along with the paramour. Id. at
856.
59. Id. at 861 n. 15.
60. Id. at 862
61. Id.
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support such a claim.
III. MILLER V. DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS
In Miller v. Department of Corrections, the California Supreme Court
unanimously held that the plaintiffs established a prima facie case of sexual
harassment, based on the widespread favoritism that pervaded their
workplace environment.62  This section examines the facts of the case,
which are crucial to understanding why the court unanimously held for the
plaintiffs, and analyzes the court's rationale for its decision.
A. Background and Facts of Miller
Miller involved a suit by two plaintiffs, Edna Miller and Frances
Mackey, who alleged that the widespread favoritism that their supervisor
engaged in created a hostile workplace environment for them.63
1. Edna Miller's Story
Edna Miller, one of the two plaintiffs in the case, began working at a
prison facility for the California Department of Corrections (Department)
in 1983. 64 In 1994, she learned that the chief deputy warden, Lewis
Kuykendall, was having sexual affairs with three women: 1) Kathy Bibb,
his secretary, 2) Debbie Patrick, an associate warden, and 3) Cagie Brown,
another employee at the facility. 65  Miller complained to Kuykendall's
superior officer about the inappropriate relationships, and the superior
reassured Miller "that she had addressed the issue. 66 The following year,
the Department transferred Miller to a different facility, where Kuykendall
had been appointed warden. 67 For the next four years, Miller was forced to
endure numerous instances of overt favoritism and harassment.6 8
As warden, Kuykendall used his authority to reward and promote his
paramours, sometimes even over the opposition of other employees. 9
Patrick, the associate warden, enjoyed unusual privileges, such as reporting
to Kuykendall and not to her immediate supervisor.70 In 1995, after an
62. 115 P.3d 77, 90 (Cal. 2005). The appellate court had affirmed summary judgment
in favor of the defendants. Id. at 80.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 81.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 82.
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interview committee declined secretary Bibb's application for a promotion,
which would have relocated her to the facility where Kuykendall was
warden,7' Kuykendall indicated that the committee should "make [the
transfer] happen. 72  Miller, who was a member of that committee,
commented that this incident made her "feel somewhat powerless because
of Kuykendall and his sexual relations with subordinates."" Moreover,
Brown and Miller directly competed for promotions twice, and both times
Brown secured the promotion, despite Miller's "higher rank, superior
education, and greater experience. 74  After Brown was promoted to
associate warden within a year and a half, an unusually short period of time
for this sort of promotion,75 other employees began asking, "[W]hat do I
have to do, 'F' my way to the top?
76
Kuykendall's women were not discreet about their relationships, and
many other employees at the facility were aware of Kuykendall's
activities. 77 Bibb bragged about her power over Kuykendall.' Brown not
only bragged about her ability to control Kuykendall, but she also clearly
stated her intention to extract benefits from him. 79 When Miller competed
with Brown for the first promotion, Brown stated that she would receive it;
otherwise, she would "'take [Kuykendall] down' with her knowledge of
'every scar on his body."' 8 In addition to hearing about the affairs from
Brown and Bibb, many employees witnessed first-hand proof of it. At
three work-related social events, employees witnessed Bibb and
Kuykendall fondle each other, and employees also watched Patrick, Bibb,
and Brown argue over Kuykendall. 8' Brown even "acknowledged that
there were widespread rumors that sexual affairs between subordinates and
their superior officers were 'common practice in the Department of
Corrections' and that there were rumors that employees, including Bibb,
secured promotion in this way. 8 2  Other employees viewed the
relationships as "unethical from a business practice standpoint" and
believed they could earn special employment benefits by engaging in
71. Id. at 81.
72. Id. Bibb eventually received the promotion, even over Patrick's opposition. Id. at
82.
73. Id. at 81.
74. Id. at 82. The officers involved in the selection process had actually recommended
Miller, not Brown for the promotion. Other employees attributed Brown's promotion to her
affair with Kuykendall. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 83.
82. Id. at 82.
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sexual affairs with Kuykendall."3
These affairs not only created an uncomfortable environment for
Miller, but the relationships also enabled the paramours to directly harass
her, both verbally and physically. 4 When the new chief deputy warden,
Vicky Yamamoto, arrived at the facility, she interfered with Miller's access
to Kuykendall.85 Miller suspected that the hostility arose from her rejection
of Yamamoto's dinner invitation. 6  Moreover, after a telephone
conversation between Miller and Brown, Brown entered Miller's office,
physically assaulted Miller, and held her captive for two hours.87 Another
employee asked Yamamoto to intervene while this was happening, but
Yamamoto refused the request.88 Miller reported the incident, but no action
was taken against Brown. 9
Although Miller continued working at the facility, she made several
complaints regarding the relationships and the resulting harassment. In
1997, when she complained to a sexual harassment advisor about the
behavior at the facility, she told the advisor that the relationships between
Brown and Kuykendall, as well as Brown and Yamamoto, created a hostile
working environment for her.90  She also complained to Kuykendall
himself about Brown and Yamamoto's interference with her job.9' In 1998,
she spoke with the Office of Internal Affairs as part of its investigation into
the behaviors of Kuykendall, Yamamoto, and Brown. 92 Rather than
ameliorating her concerns, her complaints resulted in even more harassing
conduct directed at her. When Brown and Yamamoto learned of her
complaint to Kuykendall, they began "countermanding her orders,
undermining her authority, reducing her supervisory responsibilities,
imposing additional onerous duties on her, making unjustified criticisms of
her work, and threatening her with reprisals." 93 Furthermore, because of
her cooperation with the Office of Internal Affairs, Kuykendall withdrew
disability accommodations that Miller previously enjoyed, and Brown
followed Miller home to confront her about statements made in the course
83. Id.
84. Id. at 91. ("Kuykendall explained to Miller that, because of his intimate
relationship with Brown, he would not protect plaintiffs.").
85. Id. at 83.
86. Id. There were also rumors of a relationship between Yamamoto and Brown. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 84. Instead of correcting the problem, Kuykendall just awarded Miller a
promotion. Id.
90. Id. at 83.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 84. When Miller spoke with the representative for the Office of Internal
Affairs, she had been assured that she would receive some level of confidentiality. Id.
93. Id. at 83.
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of the investigation.94 Miller resigned in August of that year, due to the
increased stress.95
2. Frances Mackey's Story
Frances Mackey was the other plaintiff in this case. She too was
aware of Kuykendall's relationships, and also suffered harassment, by both
Brown and Kuykendall, as a result of those relationships. 96 Brown believed
that Mackey had complained about Brown's affair, so Brown withdrew
Mackey's additional "inmate pay, ' '97 verbally abused Mackey in front of
Mackey's coworkers, and interfered with Mackey's job responsibilities.98
Additionally, Kuykendall reduced Mackey's responsibilities and did not
permit her to gain the work experience that she would have needed to
obtain a promotion.99
Mackey became extremely stressed and took time off from work. 00
When she returned, she had been demoted and was subjected to continuing
mistreatment and humiliation' She resigned several months later, when
the employment conditions became absolutely unbearable.
0 2
B. The Court's Decision
The court began by analyzing the standard for hostile work
environment sexual harassment. In considering whether the conduct was
severe or pervasive so as to "alter the conditions of employment and create
a work environment that qualifies as hostile or abusive," the court
considered the direct harassment against the plaintiffs.10 3  It noted that
Kuykendall's sexual relationship with Brown, combined with his refusal to
reprimand her, gave her the ability to verbally and physically harass the
plaintiffs without fear of any negative repercussions.' 04 "In this manner, his
sexual favoritism was responsible for the continuation of an outrageous
94. Id. at 84. Miller subsequently obtained a court order prohibiting Brown from
approaching Miller. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 85.
97. Id. "Inmate pay" refers to increased salary benefits that result from dealing directly
with inmates.
98. Id.
99. Id. Mackey felt that her failure to receive the promotion resulted from the fact that
she was not sexually involved with Kuykendall. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 87-88.
104. Id. at 91 (noting that "Kuykendall refused or failed to control [Brown's behavior]
even after it escalated to physical assault").
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campaign of harassment against plaintiffs."' 15
The court then considered the 1990 EEOC Policy Statement, and it
relied on the EEOC's position that widespread favoritism could create a
hostile work environment.'°6 It explained that Kuykendall's actions
regarding Bibb, Brown, and Patrick, including the unfair employment
benefits and promotions, indicated that he viewed female employees as
"sexual playthings."' 07 Furthermore, his actions conveyed the message that
advancement at the facility was based on sexual favors, rather than merit.1
0 8
Throughout its analysis, the court stressed that the sexual favoritism
was actionable because of its effect on the work environment, not the
relationships themselves.'0 9  When considering the effect of the
relationships on the environment, the court explained that the plaintiffs
alleged more than just a situation where a supervisor granted unfair benefits
to his sexual partner; they demonstrated how Kuykendall's relationships
were on public display and created a hostile environment." 0
The court also considered prior California case law. Although the
court did not find any cases directly on target, one California appellate
decision suggested in dictum that
sexual favoritism by a manager may be actionable when it leads
employees to believe that "they [can] obtain favorable treatment
from [the manager] if they became romantically involved with
him," the affair is conducted in a manner "so indiscreet as to
create a hostile work environment," or the manager has engaged
in "other pervasive conduct . . . which created a hostile work
environment."" '
The court did not definitively hold that Miller and Mackey were
victims of sexual harassment, but it stated that the plaintiffs presented a
prima facie case and created at least a triable issue of fact as to whether
Kuykendall's sexual favoritism created a hostile work environment for
them. "2
In reaching this conclusion, the California Supreme Court became the
first appellate court to apply the EEOC Policy Statement and hold that the
widespread sexual favoritism may have created a hostile work
environment.' 1'
105. Id.
106. Id. at 88-89.
107. Id. at 91.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 93.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 90 (citing Proksel v. Gattis, 49 Cal. Rptr. 2d 322 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(internal citations omitted)).
112. Miller, 115 P.3d at 91.
113. See Kadue & Kauftman, supra n. 9.
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IV. FACTORS THAT INFLUENCED THE COURT'S DECISION
The egregious facts in Miller presented an easy case for the California
Supreme Court to hold that the plaintiffs presented a prima facie case of
hostile work environment sexual harassment, derived from the widespread
sexual favoritism at the prison facility. Not only was the supervisor openly
engaging in three concurrent relationships with subordinates, but his
relationships permitted his paramours to verbally and physically abuse the
plaintiffs. With these extreme facts, it would have been surprising if the
court had not held for the plaintiffs."
14
Although the court reached the right holding in this case, it did not set
a clear standard for a hostile work environment claim based on widespread
sexual favoritism. Kuykendall's actions, as well as those of his paramours,
were so outrageous that the court was able to look at the totality of the
circumstances and determine that the relationships may have created a
hostile work environment. But what if a similar case arises, where one or
two facts present in Miller are absent? Miller surpassed the high standard
for this type of claim, but what exactly is the standard? The following
section analyzes six elements to determine which ones a plaintiff must
satisfy to make a prima facie case of hostile work environment based on
widespread sexual favoritism.
A. Number of Workplace Paramours
Most courts before Miller held that one relationship between a
supervisor and subordinate would not create an actionable claim, and
Miller probably will not change that."' In its decision, the California
Supreme Court focused on the effect of the multiple relationships on the
environment. For example, in explaining that Kuykendall's behavior
suggested that he viewed female employees as "sexual playthings,"' 16 the
court noted that both Bibb and Brown bragged to other employees about
their power to control Kuykendall, and the court also considered the
"[j]ealous scenes between the sexual partners [that] occurred in the
presence of Miller and other employees.""' 7 In this case, Kuykendall's lack
114. See Alisa J. Baker & Richard E. Levine, The Miller Case: Not So Tragic,
RECORDER, Aug. 19, 2005, at 4 (explaining that the facts in the case were egregious).
115. Jeffrey S. Klein & Nicholas J. Pappas, Employment Law; Employer Liability for
Sexual Favoritism, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 1, 2005, at 3 (col. 1) ("The Miller court suggests that if
the conduct involves only 1 paramour, the plaintiff will not have a discrimination claim.").
116. Miller, 115 P.3d 77 at 80.
117. Id. at91.
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of control over the employees with whom he was involved, coupled with
his handing out favors and ignoring workplace rules and procedures, had a
major impact on the workplace environment. The plaintiffs' case would
likely have been more difficult if they were claiming a hostile working
environment created by Kuykendall's relationship with just one woman in
the office." 8
Similarly, if a plaintiff is trying to prove quid pro quo harassment
based on the favoritism, she would almost certainly need to show the
existence of more than one relationship. Both Miller and the EEOC Policy
Statement explained that a manager who
engage[s] in widespread sexual favoritism may also communicate
a message that the way for women to get ahead in the workplace
is by engaging in sexual conduct .... This can form the basis of
an implicit "quid pro quo" harassment claim for female
employees, as well as a hostile environment claim for both
women and men who find this offensive." 9
It is doubtful that a supervisor's relationship with only one employee
would convey the message that other employees could obtain promotions
by engaging in sexual conduct.
B Openness of the Relationships
Although Miller left many questions unanswered, one thing is clear:
for a claim of widespread favoritism to be actionable, the sexual
relationships must be overt.2 0 The court stated that it would not examine
any relationships between Kuykendall and his sexual partners that were
private.' 2 ' After all, "it is not the relationship, but its effect on the
workplace, that is relevant under the applicable legal standard.' 2 2  If
Kuykendall had been discreet about the relationships and other employees
were not aware of them, the relationships would not have left employees
feeling like they needed to be sexually involved with him to obtain a
promotion.123
118. As discussed supra n. 31, the general rule is that a plaintiff cannot state a claim for
paramour favoritism based solely on a supervisor's romantic relationship with a subordinate.
119. Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra note 3.
120. See Baker & Levine, supra note 114, at 4 ("Miller does not suggest that a discreet
affair between a supervisor and subordinate will provide just any third-party employee with
an actionable claim.").
121. Miller, 115 P.3dat94.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 82.
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C. Rank of the Employees and Effect of Promotions
Kuykendall was involved with women who were his subordinates, and
as a result, he was in a position to award them promotions at the expense of
their peers. Conversely, future courts may encounter cases where plaintiffs
allege a hostile work environment based on either the relationships between
multiple co-workers, or supervisory relationships where the supervisor
refuses to hand out illicit benefits. The court would need to decide whether
these situations support a hostile work environment claim under the
standard set forth in Miller.
Both Miller and the EEOC Policy Statement refer to situations of
"favoritism." The use of this word implies that someone is receiving
special benefits as a result of the relationship. Furthermore, both Miller
and the EEOC Policy Statement directly examine the effects of
relationships between supervisors or managers and subordinates, in which
the subordinates receive employment benefits resulting from the
relationships. On their faces, these authorities indicate that a hostile work
environment claim must involve a situation where supervisors grant
promotions or other job benefits to subordinates. On the other hand, both
the Miller court and the EEOC Policy Statement imply elsewhere that
favoritism is not a required factor for stating a hostile work environment
claim based on consensual sexual relationships.
2 4
The Miller court stressed the fact that it was the environment itself,
not the relationships, that was actionable. 5 With this in mind, it is very
likely that employees could bring a hostile work environment claim, not
based on 'favoritism,' but based on the sexually charged environment that
numerous consensual office relationships could create. This would hold
true, regardless of whether the relationships occurred between supervisors
who granted benefits to their paramours, supervisors who did not grant
benefits to the paramours, or coworkers. So long as the relationships create
a workplace that is demeaning to women, both male and female employees
would likely be able to maintain a cause of action, 2 6 even in the absence of
"unwarranted and unfair employment benefits."' 127
Likewise, the EEOC Policy Statement also indicates that a plaintiff
could bring a claim for hostile work environment sexual harassment based
on a sexually charged work environment, regardless of whether the hostile
124. See Miller, 115 P.3d 77; Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra n. 3.
125. Miller, 115 P.3d 77 at 94 ("[I]t is not the relationship, but its effect on the
workplace, that is relevant under the applicable legal standard.").
126. See Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra n. 3 ("If favoritism based upon
the granting of sexual favors is widespread in a workplace, both male and female colleagues
who do not welcome this conduct can establish a hostile work environment in violation of
Title VII .... ).
127. Miller, 115 P.3d 77 at 91.
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environment results from a superior granting unfair promotions or job
benefits to a subordinate with whom he is involved. Though the Policy
Statement focuses on paramour favoritism--thus implying that favoritism is
required--in one footnote, the EEOC indicates that favoritism is not a
prerequisite to bringing a hostile work environment claim. Citing a
previous district court decision, the EEOC explained that although the case
"did not involve sexual favoritism, the case supports the proposition that
pervasive sexual conduct can create a hostile work environment for those
who find it offensive . . . even if no sexual conduct is directed at the
persons bringing the claim."'1
28
Although a claim of hostile work environment sexual harassment need
not involve favoritism or promotions, a quid pro quo action for sexual
harassment based on hostile work environment cannot exist unless it
involves a supervisor granting employment benefits to subordinates. As
mentioned in Part II, a quid pro quo action could be based on the implicit
message that women can get ahead by engaging in sexual activities with a
supervisor. If the supervisor does not promote the women with whom he is
involved, he would not be conveying the message that other women could
obtain promotions by engaging in sexual activities with him.
D. Physical Abuse
Throughout its opinion, the court mentions the instances of physical
harassment directed at the plaintiffs, but the court does not fully rely on
those instances for reaching its conclusion.129 Under the Miller standard, a
plaintiff is not required to prove that she was physically abused, nor is
physical abuse sufficient to state a claim for sexual harassment based on
widespread sexual favoritism. 3 ° However, when a plaintiff is physically
harassed, this increases the abusiveness of the environment; the plaintiffs
evidence regarding other factors need not be as compelling. Applying the
Harris standard,' the California Supreme Court stated that the conduct
must be severe enough to alter the conditions of employment.3 2 A physical
assault increases the severity and, considering the totality of the
circumstances, a plaintiff who endures physical harassment as a result of a
supervisor's favoritism may have a lower burden in the other areas.
128. Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra n. 3.
129. See Miller, 115 P.3d 77.
130. Id. See also Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (explaining
that the standard for sexual harassment "takes a middle path between making actionable any
conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological
injury").
131. Id.
132. Miller, 115 P.3d at 87 (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21).
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E. Retaliation
Under California's employment law, as well as federal law, an
employer is prohibited from retaliating against an employee who complains
about that employer's discriminatory conduct.' Although retaliation may
form the basis for a separate claim, and in this case it actually did, it was
also intertwined with the hostile environment claim because of the
environment it created. Many of the abusive actions taken against Miller
and Mackey were actually retaliation for their complaints. For example,
after Miller made several complaints about the relationships, Brown and
another employee "made Miller's work life miserable and diminished her
effectiveness by frequently countermanding her orders, undermining her
authority, reducing her supervisory responsibilities, imposing additional
onerous duties on her, making unjustified criticisms of her work, and
threatening her with reprisals."''3 4  Additionally, after Mackey made
statements to an internal affairs investigator about the hostile environment
she was working in, Kuykendall "reduced her responsibilities and denied
her access to the work experience she needed in order to be promoted.'
13 5
Although retaliation was not required for Miller and Mackey to
demonstrate a hostile work environment, since retaliation is not an element
of a hostile work environment claim, the retaliatory acts increased the
severity of the situation and likely made it easier for the court to find that
the plaintiffs presented a cognizable claim.
F. Gender of the Plaintiffs
If the genders were reversed, and the supervisor was female and the
plaintiffs were male, the plaintiffs still would have been able to bring a
hostile work environment sexual harassment claim. 136  The more
133. See California Fair Employment and Housing Act, CAL. Gov'T CODE, § 12940(h)
(West 2004) (stating that it is unlawful "[flor any employer ... to discharge, expel or
otherwise discriminate against any person because the person has opposed any practices
forbidden under this part"); see also 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (2000) ("It shall be an unlawful
employment practice for any employer to discriminate against any of his employees ...
because [the employee] has opposed any practice made an unlawful employment
practice .... ). An employee may have a retaliation claim, even if the employer's conduct
was not prohibited, so long as the "employee reasonably and in good faith believed that
what he or she was opposing constituted unlawful employer conduct such as sexual
harassment or sexual discrimination." Miller, 115 P.3d 77 at 95.
134. Miller, 115 P.3d 77 at 95.
135. Id.
136. The only difference between a male bringing a claim and a female bringing a claim
is that a male would need to show that the conduct would be offensive to a reasonable male,
whereas female plaintiffs need to show that the conduct would be offensive to a reasonable
female. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., 523 U.S. 75, 81 (1998) (explaining "that
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problematic question is whether other males at the facility would have been
able to bring a sexual harassment claim based on Kuykendall's favoritism
of his paramours. The Miller court was not forced to confront this question
directly, since both plaintiffs were female, but it chose to opine on the
issue. The court stated that "as the EEOC policy statement observes, an
atmosphere that is sufficiently demeaning to women may be actionable by
both men and women."' 37  Thus, the court indicated that a sexual
harassment claim based on widespread favoritism in the workplace could
have been brought by male employees if they had also been exposed to the
harassment.'38
When reaching its decision, the California Supreme Court cited the
1990 EEOC Policy Statement, and it quoted the passage in the statement
that said that both men and women who were offended by the conduct
could establish a hostile work environment claim. 3 9 Additionally, in
making its decision, the court did not focus on any factors that specifically
related to the gender of the plaintiffs, focusing instead on the environment.
Any employee--male or female--that witnessed the conduct, and was
offended by the environment, probably could have brought a claim for
hostile work environment sexual harassment.
40
V. THE AFTERMATH OF THE COURT'S HOLDING
As discussed in Part III, Miller was the first appellate court decision
since the EEOC Policy Statement was issued to find that the plaintiffs may
have been subjected to a hostile work environment based on widespread
favoritism.141 Many commentators believe that the effects of this holding
will be far-reaching. 42  Although the decision leaves unanswered
the objective severity of harassment should be judged from the perspective of a reasonable
person in the plaintiff's position, considering 'all the circumstances"'). The Court then gave
examples of how the context in which the behavior occurs may affect the reasonableness of
the plaintiff's claim. Id. at 81-82.
137. Miller, 115 P.3d 77 at 93.
138. Id.
139. See supra Part II.A.
140. See Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra n. 3.
141. See Kadue & Kaufman, supra note 9.
142. See Cummins, supra note 6 (stating that some lawyers predict this decision will
impact employers nationwide, because the California judges based their decision on federal
discrimination law, not state statutes). See also Karen Ertel, Warden's Consensual Affairs
Created Hostile Prison Workplace, CALIFORNIA TRIAL, Oct. 1, 2005. The author
acknowledged that the decision was under California law, but she stated that it had broader
implications. She quoted Jan Stiglitz, a law professor at California Western School of law,
as stating, "Since it is based on EEOC guidelines, it can be precedent for the application of
those guidelines, where the plaintiff can allege that a superior has had multiple sexual
partners in the workplace and has favored those partners." Id.
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questions, it indicates where sexual harassment law is headed.
Additionally, the decision may carry over to other areas of employment
law.
A. The Future of Sexual Harassment Law
Numerous commentators were disturbed by the Miller decision, 143 and
they have predicted dire consequences in the areas of both employer
liability and privacy concerns. Several authors caution that Miller greatly
expands the law of sexual harassment.'" A writer for the New York Times
predicted, "Not only will management have to worry about who is sleeping
with whom, but about who among them gets a bigger office, a better
assignment, a promotion."'' 45  Another author, fearing the decision will
cause employers to violate the privacy rights of their employees, stated,
"[T]he Court's decision will likely have deleterious effects upon employee
privacy and impose significant and what may seem as unfair burdens upon
employers to monitor employee personal relationships in an effort to avoid
sexual harassment--as defined by the Court in Miller--from developing in
the workplace." 1
46
Conversely, other authors underestimate the effect that Miller will
likely have. One article explained that Miller will not have an enormous
effect on sexual harassment law, because California courts had already
decided similar issues in prior cases. 147 "It is even less newsworthy that a
defendant's 'sexual activity' directed toward someone else can create a
sufficiently severe and pervasive effect on a plaintiffs workplace as to
143. See, e.g., Kadue & Kaufman, supra note 9, at 6 ("The Miller decision continues a
legislative and judicial process of conscripting employers into a war on sexual
immorality.").
144. See, e.g., Navarro, supra note 2 (stating that Miller "significantly expands the law
on sexual harassment"); see also Jack Steven Sholkoff, California Supreme Court Expands
Definition of Sexual Harassment; Court Imposes New Duties on Employers to Monitor
Effects of Consensual Relationships Between Employees, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, July 25,
2005 (warning that this decision "[d]ramatically increas[es] the potential breadth of sexual
harassment law"); Ann K. Smith & Breann Swann, 2006 California Labor and Employment
Law Update, MONDAQ Bus. BRIEFING, Jan. 11, 2006 (explaining that the decision greatly
increases the scope of sexual harassment law).
145. Navarro, supra note 2.
146. Sholkoff, supra note 144; see also Navarro, supra note 2 ("[Employees] involved in
a relationship may find out that a lot more of their private life is going to be exposed."); see
also Smith & Swann, supra note 144 (stating that employers may have to implement non-
fraternization policies, which "implicate a whole host of privacy concerns and, if required,
will force employers to walk what may prove to be an impossibly fine line between
preventing hostile work environment sexual harassment and violating the civil liberties of
their employees").
147. Baker & Levine, supra note 114.
20071
826 U. PA. JOURNAL OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW [Vol. 9:4
create a hostile work environment." 148 In support of this argument, the
author cited Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp. , 149 a previous California
sexual harassment case.
Both positions misinterpret the effect that Miller will have on future
sexual harassment cases. The authors who claim Miller will not have an
enormous impact on employment law place undue emphasis on Fisher,
which is crucially different from Miller: Fisher involved sexual
harassment directed at the plaintiff and uninvited sexual actions toward
other employees, 5 ° whereas Miller involved consensual sexual activity.
Fisher does not implicate a potential duty on employers to monitor
consensual relationships, and so Miller may impose on the employer a new
obligation to keep aware of consensual relationships in the office or other
workplace.'' Thus, the Miller decision is 'newsworthy' for employers and
others in the employment law community.
Still, the critics who fear Miller will have a tremendous impact on
sexual harassment law overestimate the scope of the Miller decision.
These commentators believe that "employers now have a heightened
burden to control consensual romantic relationships between supervisory
employees and their subordinates."'' While top executives may feel more
inclined to monitor workplace affairs between employees, employers are
not required to prohibit the relationships, and they will not need to become
intimately involved in the details of the relationships. 5 3 In fact, the Miller
court did not contradict the longstanding rule allowing paramour
favoritism; it favorably cited a lower court decision, which held that one
instance of paramour favoritism in a small office did not create a hostile
work environment.
54
Two critics predicted that Miller would result in a "workplace that is
more polite and less sexual, if more sterile and less fun.' 55 The same
authors discussed Lyle v. Warner Brothers Television Productions, 1 6 asexual harassment case that was pending in the California Supreme Court
148. Id.
149. 214 Cal. App. 3d 590 (1989).
150. Id. at 600.
151. See Cummins, supra note 6 (explaining that a plaintiff could bring a sexual
harassment claim based on the relationships of other employees, "even if all of the affairs
are consensual, and even if the boss never looks your way").
152. Smith & Swann, supra note 144.
153. See Joanna Grossman, Can Consensual Workplace Sex Create a Hostile
Environment?, CNN.COM, July 29, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/LAW/07/29/grossman.workplace/index.htm (last visited Mar.
30, 2007) (stating that "[e]mployers need not prohibit office romance").
154. 115 P.3d at 90 (citing Proskel v. Gattis, 41 Cal. App. 4th 1626 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996)).
155. See Kadue & Kaufman, supra note 9, at 6.
156. 132 P.3d211 (Cal. 2006).
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when they wrote the article. The plaintiff in Lyle was a production
assistant on the set of the television show, Friends, and she claimed that
she was subjected to a hostile work environment based on the "writers' use
of sexually coarse and vulgar language and conduct.""' The authors of the
article stated, "After Miller, it seems doubtful that the California Supreme
Court would pass up a chance to promote further litigation against sexual
conduct in the workplace, on the ground that it could send a 'demeaning
message' to women." 58 The authors' fears were unfounded. In rejecting
the plaintiff's claim, the Lyle court cited Miller and acknowledged that "the
prohibition against sexual harassment includes protection from a broad
range of conduct, ranging from expressly or impliedly conditioning
employment benefits on submission to or tolerance of unwelcome sexual
advances, to the creation of a work environment that is hostile or abusive
on the basis of sex." 5 9 Nonetheless, the court rejected the plaintiffs claim
because "the record discloses that most of the sexually coarse and vulgar
language at issue did not involve and was not aimed at plaintiff or other
women in the workplace."' 160  Thus, after the California Supreme Court
expanded the scope of a hostile work environment claim in Miller, the
court used Lyle to clarify that a plaintiff must still satisfy the basic
requirements of a sexual harassment claim based on a hostile work
environment.
Furthermore, contrary to several authors' contentions, Miller will not
lead to the destruction of employees' privacy rights. As discussed above in
Part III, the Miller court was concerned about the workplace environment,
not the individual relationships themselves. The affairs in Miller were
problematic, mainly because they were openly displayed so that everyone
in the facility knew of their existence. 6' Accordingly, any relationships
having such a detrimental effect on the workplace environment, so as to
satisfy the Miller standard for hostile work environment sexual harassment
based on widespread favoritism, will not require an employer to dig deep
into its employees' private lives because Miller requires that the
relationships are not discreet. 162
157. Id. at 215.
158. See Kadue & Kaufman, supra note 9, at 6.
159. Lyle, 132 P.3d at 219 (citing Miller v. Department of Corrections, 115 P.3d 77, 77
(Cal. 2005)).
160. Id. at 215.
161. See supra Part IV.B.
162. The defendants in Miller raised this potential privacy intrusion as part of their
defense, but the Miller court explicitly rejected the defense and stated that it did not believe
that "defendants' concerns about regulating personal relationships are well founded, because
it is not the relationship, but its effect on the workplace, that is relevant under the applicable
legal standard. Thus, [the court did not discuss] those interactions between Kuykendall and
his sexual partners that were truly private." Miller, 115 P.3d at 94.
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B. Miller's Effect on Other Areas of Employment Discrimination
Miller involved an allegation of sexual harassment based on
widespread favoritism, but both the Miller decision, as well as the 1990
EEOC Policy Statement, suggest that a plaintiff in other areas of
employment law might be able to bring a claim based on discriminatory
conduct that was not specifically directed at them. For example, the EEOC
Policy Statement explained,
An analogy can be made to a situation in which supervisors in an
office regularly make racial, ethnic or sexual jokes. Even if the
targets of the humor "play along" and in no way display that they
object, co-workers of any race, national origin or sex can claim
that this conduct, which communicates a bias against protected
class members, creates a hostile work environment for them.
63
The Miller court favorably cites this paragraph in its decision, and
although it seemingly extends the court's holding to other protected groups
under Title VII, the cited passage is not a radical departure from prior case
law. In fact, the EEOC based the above paragraph on a 1971 5th Circuit
decision.' 64 The Rogers decision has been widely cited, and in Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 165 the Supreme Court cited Rogers and acknowledged that
"a Hispanic complainant could establish a Title VII violation by
demonstrating that her employer created an offensive work environment for
employees by giving discriminatory service to its Hispanic clientele."' 166 In
another case, an African-American employee claimed that he was subjected
to a hostile work environment because he had walked into his supervisor's
office and saw a noose hanging on the wall. 67 Although the plaintiff did
not present evidence that the noose was specifically meant to insult him,
the court considered the noose to be severe enough to create a hostile work
environment, and it denied the employer's motion for summary
judgment.
168
163. Policy Guidance on Employer Liability, supra note 3.
164. Id. (referring to Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234 (5th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds).
165. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
166. Id. at 66. But see Epelbaum v. Elf Atochem, N. Am., Inc., 40 F. Supp. 2d 429, 433
(E.D. Ky. 1999) (rejecting the plaintiff's hostile work environment claim; although some of
the ethnic jokes were directed at the plaintiff based on his ethnicity, the court did not
consider the discriminatory statements about females, African-Americans or Asians,
because it would "consider only the references directly relating to the decedent").
167. Williams v. NYC Housing Auth., 154 F. Supp. 2d 820, 821 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
168. Id. at 826.
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EPILOGUE
The California Supreme Court's decision in Miller is important both
because it is the first appellate decision to follow the EEOC's position in its
1990 Policy Statement, in which it allows for a claim of sexual harassment
based on widespread favoritism, and the decision adds a new facet to the
body of existing case law regarding hostile work environment sexual
harassment. The decision does not, however, dramatically reverse
established case law regarding paramour favoritism. Rather, it brings a
new element to the issue, and it creates a new cause of action for plaintiffs
who work in such a hostile environment.
While it is not likely that the next case to deal with this issue will have
facts that are as egregious as those in Miller, at least one similar case is
already brewing. 6 9 Thus, it is important for courts to realize exactly which
factors were most influential for the Miller court, so that they can decide
whether the allegations in the cases they confront provide cognizable
claims.
A new standard this case with it brings
Kuykendall, for sorrow, should not show his head
Go hence, to have more talk of these sad things;
Some shall be pardon 'd, and some punished:
For never was there a case of such misbehaviors
Than that of Kuykendall and his paramours.
169. See Cummins, supra note 6 (discussing a case in Minnesota, in which an employee
argued that her employer's public affair with a subordinate, as well as the favoritism he
accorded the paramour, created an environment that was "so sexually charged that the
collective effect was severe and pervasive"). Although some of the elements of the
Minnesota case are similar to those in Miller, and the plaintiff will likely cite Miller, Miller
probably will not support her argument, since she is basing her claim on only one
relationship in the workplace.
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